

How vote-buying hinders progressive social policy in Latin America

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Abstract

Latin American welfare systems are marked by a high degree of regressive spending patterns despite of the large share of low-income voters. Consequently, lower income groups benefit proportionally less from welfare services compared to the already better-off. We argue that it is the clientelistic practices of political parties that distort the link between the vested interest of low-income individuals in particular, and across all income groups in general, and the outcome of redistributive policies, building a micro foundation for the endurance of regressive social policies in the region. By paying off the poor, who come at lower costs, in return for their vote, clientelistic parties gain greater leverage to pursue an elitist political agenda so that regressive social policies are reinforced. To substantiate this argument, we investigate which factors account for an individual's vote intention for parties that pursue regressive social policies merging information on party strategies from DALP and individual level data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2010). Findings confirm the intuition that vote-buying increases the likelihood for low-income earners to vote for more regressive party platforms. Moreover, clientelism does not only influence low-income voters alone, but the impact is observable across all income groups.

Keywords: vote buying, social policy, individual vote intention, Latin America

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1 Introduction

Welfare states in low- and middle-income democracies are haunted in many ways: they suffer from resource scarcity, economic volatility, and institutional inefficiencies. But apart from these structural weaknesses, social policies are first of all a product of the political decision-making process that takes into account voter interests, party strategies, and the influence of dominant groups such as business elites and labor unions (see Huber and Stephens 2001; Mares 2003). The types of welfare coalitions that are produced have historical roots in the structure of the class system (Huber and Stephens 2012) and economic policies of the past (see Wibbels and Ahlquist 2011). While many low- and middle-income countries are adopting more progressive (universal) welfare policies¹ such as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), noncontributory pensions, and welfare subsidies to encounter severe income inequality and poverty, we still find many welfare policies in place that distribute benefits disproportionately to the income structure (see Lindert et al. 2006). The poor benefited from the governments' increasing incentives to invest in human capital to remain competitive at the global market (see Rudra 2008) and also from international efforts to foster basic health care provision in recent decades. But universal social policies – that have been identified as significant for poverty and inequality reduction (Korpi and Palme 1998; Rothstein 2011) – are largely absent in low- and middle-income democracies. In contrast, several states rather appear to have come to a halt in a developmental stalemate, with high-income inequality, weak state capacity and an ideologically loosely connected society which Rothstein identified as “low-trust-corruption-inequality trap” (2011: 146). Latin America in particular represents the region with the most inegalitarian income distribution. Despite the large share of low-income earners, why are regressive (residualistic) social policies so persistent?

Taking into account the well identified explanatory factors of redistributive and social policy preferences such as individual income and income inequality (Meltzer and Richard 1981), social mobility expectations and uncertainty (Piketty 1995, Benabou and Ok 2001), education and skills (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack et al. 2006), religiosity and ethnicity (Scheve and Stasavage 2006, Roemer 1998), labor market status (Rhem 2009) and the level of information (Bartels 2010), that have been mainly supported for advanced industrial societies, we advocate a closer look at the linkage strategies of political parties and voters in contexts of low state capacity.

¹ We refer to progressive and regressive social policies in order to emphasize on the distributive outcome of social protection programs. Progressive social policy adheres to a universal welfare regime while regressive social policy goes together with the residualistic welfare state.

Structures of competition between political parties in Latin America are to various extents shaped by clientelistic linkages between citizens and political parties. For the purpose of the present paper, clientelism is defined as a “direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2, *italics original*). We follow this conception of clientelism as it focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon which directly relate to the electoral process in democratic political systems (see Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Piattoni, 2001; Stokes, 2007). Clientelism is, thus, understood as an electoral mobilization strategy based on the distribution of particularistic benefits for voters. It may be distinguished from other – more programmatic – forms of distributional strategies through the conditionality of the exchange relationship. Clientelistic parties target specific citizens and reward them with particularistic benefits conditional on their willingness to support the party – either with their votes or as activists (Stokes 2007). However, when individuals do not use their vote to make programmatic choices but cast it based on a clientelistic rationale, then the resulting electoral outcome should influence the types of social policies that are implemented. Moreover, what we know from the literature on clientelism, low-income earners are among the most favored targets of political machines as their support comes at lower cost (see Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Stokes et al. 2013). Additionally, it is often argued that clientelistic parties do not have incentives to pursue policies which foster economic growth and decrease income inequalities (Kitschelt 2000, Stokes 2007). As a positive economic development ameliorates the income structure of the working population, this also means that potential clients come at higher prices. Following this logic, clientelistic parties should pursue more conservative and status quo enhancing social policies, – meaning regressive social policies for the Latin American case. This assumption has however not been object of rigorous empirical analysis yet.

Progressive social policy, however, is most beneficial for the poor (see Lindert et al. 2006) so that we can assume that low-income earners prefer progressive welfare policy, all else constant. Thus, it is exactly the propensity of parties to target low-income earners with a clientelistic mobilization strategy and to favor status quo enhancing social policies that fosters distortive representation, which decreases the likelihood that political parties come into power which pursue more progressive welfare programs. But also middle- and high-income earners are likely to vote for more regressive social policies, even though based on a different rationale. Observing a high level of clientelism in the system, which illustrates weak state capacity, decreases preferences for a redistributive welfare state (Rothstein et al. 2012) so that both middle- and high-income earners prefer a residualistic welfare system.

We do not study the entire causal chain, which is too big an endeavor, but start with the first part, the influence of vote-buying on the individual's vote intention for political parties that score high on regressive social policy issues. This study, hence, questions if clientelism does not only lead to “perverse accountability” as Stokes (2005) has emphasized but also to ‘perverse responsiveness’, by exploiting specific groups of voters that are especially responsive to material benefits (low-income voters) in a way that undermines their voice for their preferred policy preferences and by decreasing confidence in the public goods game (middle- and high-income voters), so that social policies remain more regressive or at the status quo (which is equivalent in many cases) (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Stokes et al. 2013). In this article we therefore address the following two questions: (a) does clientelism decrease the likelihood of political parties to pursue progressive social policies?, and, if so, (b) does clientelism increase the likelihood across all income groups to vote for parties that pursue regressive social policies?

We study the link between clientelism, more specifically vote buying which we define as the “exchange of goods (benefits, protections) for one's own vote” (Stokes 2007: 606), and social policy for the Latin American (LA hereafter) context because both phenomena have a long tradition and are still crucial in this region (see Huber and Stephens 2012 on welfare state development in LA and Roniger and Günes-Ataya 1994 on the historical development of clientelism in the region). Clientelistic parties scoring high on less redistributive social policies is a central prerequisite for the proposed mechanism, so that we start out with an analysis on the link between clientelistic parties and their orientation regarding social policies, making use of the expert survey data set of the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP). Using principal component analysis to generate an indicator for progressive versus regressive social policy orientation for the political parties, we match this information with survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2010). A hierarchical varying-intercept model is applied since we are making use of cross-country survey data which carries explanatory power for the dependent variable at both individual and country level.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the redistributive effects of social policies in Latin America and elaborates on the question if clientelistic bargains are necessarily bad for the clients. Section 3 introduces and tests the expected link between clientelism and political parties' orientation on social policy issues. Section 4 discusses the theoretical framework for the vote-buying mechanism. Subsequently, the empirical strategy, estimation model and variables are presented. In section 5 we discuss the results and implications and section 6 tests the sensitivity of the findings. The last section concludes.

2 Social Policy and its Distributive Effects


Given the large number of low-income earners and decades of striking income inequality and poverty, what hinders more progressive welfare systems in the Latin American region? In Latin America social security has the most far-reaching historical roots compared to health care and education policy. Basic social insurance systems emerged in the beginning of the 20th century (Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Benefits were however only accessible for a small circle of elites such as public employees, following a Bismarckian style, and the exclusionary nature still marks the design of social security today. The heavy lifting for redistribution comes from social policies and less so from the tax system which is also slightly regressive in many Latin American states (e. g. high rates of value added taxation (VAT)). Regressive social policy, also called residualistic, favors high-income earners, as returns do not decrease with increasing income (e. g. lump sum benefits). With respect to the region, it is mostly health care and education expenditures that generate a more progressive outcome (see Huber and Stephens 2012), meaning that resource distribution is proportional to the individual's means and needs and increases with decreasing income. According to the Meltzer-Richard model (1981), increased income inequality should induce greater spending on welfare because of the changing distance between mean and median voter. Researchers have illustrated that the Meltzer-Richard model mostly fails at the macro level (see Kenworthy and McCall 2008), but at the micro-level it finds support (see Finseraas 2009). Demand for redistribution rises with increasing income inequality in the OECD context. Similarly, the Latin American public is sensitive to the fairness or unfairness of the income distribution according to Cramer and Kaufman (2011), so that one could expect larger support for more progressive, or in different terms universal, social policies.

We argue in this study that clientelism erodes the substantive relationship between voters and parties, distorting the responsiveness of political parties. One might contend that clientelism works as an equivalent to the welfare state since benefits are provided here as well, however, differing in the allocation key and the conditionality of the exchange (for a discussion see Kitschelt 2000; Stokes et al. 2013). In this sense, clientelism may be seen as an appropriate party strategy in places where political institutions are dysfunctional (Gay 1999; Kitschelt 2000; Hilgers 2009, 2011). Furthermore, from a clients' perspective the exchange of particularistic goods may be perceived as a viable solution to social problems (Auyero 1999; Hilgers 2009). Especially in the light of low state capacity and government efficiency, exchanging votes or political support for short-term material benefits may be perceived as a 'good bargain' by the recipients of these benefits. However, non-programmatic social policy is unable to harmonize the income distribution as clientelistic benefits are exclusive in nature,

supporting the persistence of truncated welfare systems (see De Ferranti et al. 2004). Moreover, vote buying can severely harm the public in general due to inefficient resource allocation, reduced influence over public policy, and diminished political accountability of representatives (Stokes et al. 2013: 245-254). Also recent empirical findings contradict the assumption of a substitution effect (e.g. Hilgers 2009) and the descriptive statistics below hint towards a negative relationship between clientelism and generous social policy as well.

In this paper, we introduce a mechanism for the proposed relationship between clientelistic parties and less redistributive social policies in low- and middle-income democracies. . In order to illustrate the argument we graphically describe the proposed mechanism in Figure 1. To investigate the alleged macro link, we propose that clientelistic parties influence the voter through vote-buying so that she casts her vote for a clientelistic party. As clientelistic parties are assumed to be more likely to pursue less redistributive social policies, regressive social policy is the likely outcome. Of course, it is a long way down from electoral results to policy outcomes, and studying the entire causal mechanism goes beyond the scope of this paper. We therefore focus on the first two steps of the causal chain: (1) putting the assumption that clientelistic parties are associated with regressive social policies to an empirical test and (2) assessing how clientelism influences the vote-intention of the individual.

Figure 1: The mechanism of clientelism and regressive social policy



We acknowledge, that we cannot infer from a political party's programmatic stance on social policy issues on implemented social policy and its distributive outcomes as this is a long causal chain that is influenced by further aspects. Especially for the Latin American context it can be questioned

that political parties are reliable in their programmatic appeal as Stokes (2001) has illustrated for the 1990's, when left parties suddenly propagated neoliberal policies. Moreover, all parties are equally constrained by resource scarcity so that the willingness to spend does sometimes just not meet the available means (see Huber et al. 2008). Finally, our analytical focus rests on the influence of vote-buying and the individual's vote intention, making no empirical claims how this translates into social policies.

3 Parties' Social Policy Position and Clientelism

Due to the long history of clientelistic structures and its adaptation to very different contexts research on this topic is confronted with a variety of sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting definitions of the concept (see Hilgers, 2011 for a comprehensive overview). We follow a conception of clientelism that focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon which directly relate to the electoral process in democratic political systems (see Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Piattoni, 2001; Stokes, 2007a). Therefore, the linkage concept is a useful analytical tool to study different relationships between political parties and the electorate without a predetermined focus on programmatic party competition (e.g. Kitschelt, 2000).

On the one hand, political parties may mobilize electoral support following a programmatic linkage strategy and appeal to their voters with policy programs. These programs consist of policy bundles concerning a range of solutions to the problems of a society. In this regard, parties that pursue a programmatic linkage strategy induce voters to signal their policy preferences at election time (Downs, 1957). On the other hand, political parties may rely on a clientelistic linkage strategy. Here, we define clientelism in the sense of vote buying as *a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, protections) for one's own vote*" (Stokes 2007a: 606, italics original). Unlike the programmatic linkage, clientelism undermines the favourable (though unintended) consequences of political competition for the quality of representation. Since "the use of the vote as a currency to buy material benefits subverts the ostensible purpose of the electoral process in a representative democracy" (Hopkin 2006: 410), a negative effect on parties' responsiveness to the policy preferences of the voters may be expected. Consequently, when considering political parties' responsiveness to voter demands in less developed democracies, a central and very persistent feature needs factored in: the role of clientelism. Arguments in the literature hint to the conclusion that clientelistic parties rather pursue policies that favor the free market instead of the state in ruling the economy, that are rather discretionary than

universalistic, and that are more conservative than progressive (e.g. Kitschelt 2000, Luna 2014). However, to determine the effect of clientelism on public policy we need to investigate the substantive relationship between the clientelistic linkage strategy and specific policy programs. There are two different perspectives as regards the combinability of clientelistic with programmatic linkage strategies. Research grouped around the *trade-off hypothesis* argues that programmatic and clientelistic linkages are only combinable to a small degree (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Kitschelt 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2001). Based on the assumption that both programmatic and clientelistic linkage strategies require different organizational investments parties are precluded to pursue both forms of linkage extensively. Moreover, it is plausible that the kind of ideologically grounded universalistic principle of left libertarian parties impacts the feasibility of clientelism. Especially those parties that focus on social inequality issues and redistribution may compromise their credibility when engaging in clientelistic practices (see Kitschelt, 2000).

Moreover, recent literature on strategic mixing of linkages supports the argument that political actors may pursue different forms of linkages at the same time and for several reasons. Building on this literature, clientelistic parties may be associated with regressive social policy schemes due to two reasons: the broker argument and the portfolio-diversification argument. In each case the combination of a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization with a specific programmatic outline to maximize a party's utility, comes at some cost.

With respect to the *broker argument*, clientelistic parties may combine vote buying strategies to address poor constituencies with policy concessions to party brokers or private investors within the clientelistic network (Stokes 2005). Policy preferences of these patrons are assumed to be more to the right of the economic scale than the preferences of poor constituencies. With respect to the *portfolio-diversification argument*, clientelistic and programmatic strategies of political parties to mobilize voters are not mutually exclusive (see Figure 2 in the Appendix). A political party may use portfolio-diversification to win elections and address different constituencies with different linkage forms (see Magaloni et al. 2007; Luna 2014). Such strategy mixing may be a consequence of either risk-aversion of political elites (Magaloni et al. 2007; Stokes 2007a; Wantchekon 2003) or the parallel appeal to diverse constituencies which are then combined into one electoral coalition (Gibson 1997). Hence, if political parties in government focus their policy programs more likely on voters that are not inclined to give their vote in exchange to material inducements, clientelism may induce inequality in democratic representation in favor of high-income and high-skilled constituencies. This may then lead to a regressive social policy outline of clientelistic parties, since rich constituencies are, on

average, more likely represented on a programmatic basis (Dixit and Londregan 1998). Based on these arguments we can state the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, clientelistic parties are more likely to pursue regressive social policies.

3. 1 Empirical Strategy of Part 1

The analytical goal of this part of our analysis aims at the the association between a political parties degree of vote-buying and a parties position on a social policy dimension. Our argument is based on the assumption that clientelistic parties pursue a more regressive social policy agenda. We use survey data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) - compiled between 2007 and 2009 - which contains expert ratings on political parties' policy stances, organizational characteristics, and linkage strategies. We restrict the analysis to the Latin American countries to hold scope conditions such as historical pathway and culture to some degree constant.

3. 2 Model

In order to test the hypothesis we make use of both an OLS regression with clustered standard errors and a hierarchical varying-intercept linear regression. We can assume that parties are nested in countries so that we need to take into account the nesting structure. As Steenbergen and Jones (2002) emphasize, standard errors might otherwise be inflated so that the use of hierarchical modeling techniques are highly recommended. Following the notation used in Gelman and Hill (2007) the hierarchical model is specified as follows, with $p=1... P$ for parties and $j=1... N$ for countries and X representing a vector of further control variables:

$$Y_{pj} = \alpha_{pj} + \beta_1 \text{ vote buying}_p + \beta_2 X_p + \varepsilon_p$$

$$\alpha_j = \beta_0 + \eta_j$$

$$\eta_j \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta)$$

3.3 Variables and Controls

Experts have been asked to rank political parties effort with respect to both the programmatic and the clientelistic linkage strategy. Both questions are categorical and range from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the respective linkage (see item wordings E2 and E3 in the Appendix). The vote-buying scale is based on the expert's evaluation of party's usage of "consumer goods" for supporters (see B1 Appendix). Building the mean of the expert responses a quasi-continuous measure of a parties' degree of each linkage strategy is derived. Moreover, experts were asked to rank political parties regarding their social policy positions on three different issue dimensions (redistribution dimension (item D1); free-market dimension (item D2); public spending dimension (item D3) using a 10-point scale (with higher values indicating more conservative policy positions). These three policy dimensions were then combined into one social policy index. The principal component factor loadings of the three dimensions are reported in the Appendix. The eigenvalue of the first dimension is 2.77, explaining 92.4 % of the variation in the three dimensions. Furthermore, we control for two further party characteristics: a political party's age as well as the party's seat share in the legislature since they are conducive for the building of linkages as well as the development of parties' policy platforms. In addition to these party characteristics we also control for two party system features: the effective number of parliamentary parties and the degree of polarization in a party system. These two characteristics influence on the mobilization strategies and the availability of resources of political parties, and therefore, need to be controlled for.

Table 1: Regression Analysis of Vote Buying on Party Positions on Redistribution

DV: Social Policy Position	(M 1) hierarchical model	(M 2) OLS
vote buying	0.752* (0.330)	0.703+ (0.395)
programmatic linkage	-0.942+ (0.530)	-0.899 (0.558)
charismatic linkage	0.153 (0.329)	0.224 (0.351)
party age	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
party seat share	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.015)
ENPP (log)	-0.002 (0.481)	0.016 (0.457)
polarization	0.050	0.055

	(0.063)	(0.055)
constant	0.169 (2.234)	-0.136 (2.699)
Random effects parameters		
var (constant)	0.154 (0.348)	
var (residual)	2.370 (0.445)	
N Level 1 (party)	84	84
N Level 2 (country)	18	
Chi ²	20.48	
//	-164.59	-153.25
r ²		0.206
BIC	373.49	341.95
+ p <0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001		
Source: DALP (2009)		

Table 1 confirms that, *ceteris paribus*, political parties pursue more regressive social policies the more they rely on a clientelistic linkage strategy to mobilize supporters. The coefficient of the party's clientelistic linkage effort is positive and moderately significant, confirming the assumptions made in the literature on clientelistic parties' rather conservative policy stances. Moreover, the relationship is reversed with respect to political parties' effort in the programmatic linkage strategy. The coefficient of a parties' effort in the programmatic linkage has a negative sign and is marginally significant. Thus, those parties which pursue a programmatic linkage strategy are more likely to position themselves more to the left end of the social policy spectrum. These insights build a first step towards disentangling the macro link between clientelism and regressive social policy schemes depicted in Figure 1.

4 The Argument: How Vote-Buying Hinders Progressive Social Policy

We just illustrated that clientelistic parties indeed pursue less redistributive social policies. But what is the micro mechanism for individuals to consent to vote-buying and subsequently, to cast their vote for a party which pursues a social policy that is not in their very interest? The basic utility function of the individual with regard to her vote intention follows a rational choice logic.² We assume that

² For a critical consideration of the limits of rational choice institutionalism in Latin America see Weyland (2002).

individuals maximize utility by maximizing income and income security, which is reached via an efficient welfare system that provides generous transfers and insurance in times of need. Welfare generosity involves taxation and employment-related contributions so that low- and middle-income earners benefit the most from a progressive, universal welfare system, keeping the skewed income distribution in Latin America in mind. When social policy is regressive it is the high-income group, which benefits the most as discussed above. An individual's vote intention for a party that pursues a certain social policy should be, henceforth, a function of the individual's redistributive and social policy preferences. Therefore, vote intention is based on the usual suspects income, age, education, gender, risk aversion, religiosity, and ethnicity (see Meltzer and Richard 1981; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Cusack et al. 2006; Scheve and Stasavage 2006; Rehm 2009). Moreover, individuals also consider social mobility, especially potential future upward mobility, in their utility function considering the ideal type of social policy (Piketty 1995). Expecting to be rich in the future, individuals oppose higher tax burdens for the high-income group already today (Benabou and Ok 2001). However, we cannot easily transfer a model that explains redistributive preferences to the model which explains an individual's vote choice, as the preference for a political party is based on a broader set of dimensions. Our general research question alludes to the contribution of Roemer (1998) on "[w]hy the poor do not expropriate the rich", explaining the adoption of a tax rate that is less favorable for low-income earners with multi-dimensionality of the policy space and the party's campaigns on multiple issue dimensions (making the case for the effect of religiosity). Despite the impact of the above-enumerated factors for an individual's redistributive preferences, the individual might cast her vote on a different policy issue that is more salient to her (e. g. voting for a conservative party as a low-income earner because of religious attitude), which needs to be kept in mind for the analysis below. Nevertheless, the socio-economic dimension is highly relevant for voters in the Latin American context (Wiesehomeier and Doyle 2012; Zechmeister and Corral 2013). For simplicity reasons, we start with a basic model that derives the individual's vote intention for a party, which scores high on progressive social policy, from the individual's socio-economic status (income, education, age, gender, employment status), her ideological beliefs (preference on income inequality) and her level of political interest/information. Preferences for progressive social policy should decrease with rising income, higher levels of education, secure employment and a conservative or liberal ideology. Age can have curvilinear influence because redistributive social policy is most beneficial for the young (regarding public investment in education) and the elderly (with respect to pensions). Now, when vote-buying comes in we argue that the vote-intention will be subverted so that particularly low-income individuals vote against their vested interest. The

mechanism works through the cost-benefit calculation of the individual to engage in ‘vote-selling’ or not.

As pointed out above, vote-buying involves a certain (and most notably immediate) benefit for the individual. Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) promote the theory of the *diminishing marginal utility of income*. The higher the income of the individual, the lower the utility that the individual derives from the clientelistic benefit. Consequently, the utility of the clientelistic benefit is higher the lower the income of the voter, so that low-income earners are more likely to consent to vote-selling (given that we assume that they maximize their utility through income)³. Thus, clientelism counts on socio-economic disadvantages of some parts of the society as the costs of a vote buying strategy rise with the income of the targeted voters (Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Brusco et al. 2004; Stokes 2007b). Next to the *diminishing marginal utility of income* theorem, others argue that the propensity to engage in vote-selling depends on the individual’s *risk aversion* (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Magaloni et al. 2007). Social policy needs time to be implemented and it is uncertain if the outcome will be any close to the promised one during election time (Stokes 2001 serves as a very good example for such a case). Hence, the immediate benefit can have a higher utility for the individual than some opaque public good in the future. Since the clientelistic linkage relies on direct material inducements, this strategy becomes more likely the stronger voters value such side payments and the lesser they value future benefits from the provision of public goods (Kitschelt 2000). Moreover, some social policies such as unemployment insurance and pensions are not immediately distributed in times of need, but at some future time point. Waiting for public goods to be distributed can, hence, be a very risky endeavor. Especially low-income voters might just not have the time to wait for welfare goods to be distributed as they are in great need for material support to sustain their living, so that they need to rely on the immediate benefit provided through non-programmatic politics. As the theorem of *decreasing marginal utility of income* has found the most robust empirical support (see Stokes et al. 2013), our main focus is on the conditional effect of clientelism on income regarding the impact of income on the dependent variable vote intention.

Consequently, vote-buying should be most attractive for low-income earners, for whom the utility of income is still sufficiently high so that the additional benefit matters, who are more risk averse (see Stokes et al. 2013) and who have less time to waste. In such a case, the benefits of vote-

³ Vote-buying can oppose the ideological conviction of the individual, so that the individual needs to decide how much weight she attributes to either the benefit or her ideological belief (see Stokes et al. 2013: 162; Brusco et al. 2004). But as low-income earners are potentially in greater need for the benefit, it is more likely that the benefit outweighs ideological considerations (see Stokes et al. 2013).

buying outweigh the long term effects of the individuals' ideological beliefs and her social policy preferences so that low-income earners are more likely to vote against their vested interest by casting the vote for a clientelistic party.

Hypothesis 2a: Low-income earners are more likely to vote for parties that pursue regressive social policies if the level of clientelism is high. The impact of clientelism is more influential for low-income earners compared to middle- and high income voters.

The rationale of high-income earners follows a different mechanism. For the high-income earners we expect clientelism to have a reinforcing effect because a system which is based on clientelism will not be considered as fruitful investment for tax money so that the rich prefer even less redistribution from the state than their already lower preferences for redistribution based on their income level. Even though high-income earners are unlikely targets of clientelism, observing a high degree of clientelism is conceived as a signal of lower state capacity and therefore, decreases preferences for a redistributive, universal welfare state (see Rothstein et al. 2012).

Hypothesis 2b: High-income earners are more likely to vote for parties that pursue regressive social policies if the level of clientelism is high to reinforce the exclusionary welfare system.

The clientelism effect is most difficult to predict for the middle-income group in contrast to low- and high-income earners. Middle-income individuals are also less likely targets of clientelistic practices, but they are at the same time in greater need for progressive welfare policies compared to the high income group. But similarly, observing a high level of clientelism in the system increases the conviction that the returns to paid contributions will not match the costs so that a residualistic welfare state is preferred. Especially middle-income earners should be very sensitive to the riskiness of an investment (here, regarding tax money) , as they are the ones who have the most to lose.

Hypothesis 2c: Middle-income earners are more likely to vote for parties that pursue regressive social policies if the level of clientelism is high.

Our underlying assumption that it is in the very best interest for low-income earners to vote for parties which pursue progressive social policies demands a caveat though. Individuals can place higher weight on immediate benefits that follow from the clientelistic relationship in contrast to a social policy that might *never* be implemented. Hence, it could be the vested interest of the low-

income group to pursue the immediate benefit, following the principle that ‘a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush’, so that vote-selling reflects the best available, and very rationale, solution for them. However, this would imply that states are unable to move from a ‘bad’ equilibrium of low state capacity, high inequality, and high levels of clientelism towards a ‘good’ equilibrium of well-functioning institutions and a generous welfare state, to use the terminology of Rothstein (2011), and that individuals just resign in this steady state. We object this concern, assuming that low-income voters are generally interested in policy improvements, especially, when they have social mobility expectations and when they have children for whom these long-term developments are vital. Moreover, we address this caveat by considering state capacity in the empirical model.

4. 1 Empirical Strategy of Part 2: The Micro Logic

The analytical goal of our analysis aims at the the influence of vote-buying on the individual’s vote intention for parties which score high on regressive social policy issues. We use survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) from 2010 which contains information needed to study individual voting behavior, and the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) - compiled between 2007 and 2009 - which contains expert ratings on political parties’ policy stances, organizational characteristics, and linkage strategies. Although the LAPOP conducts the cross-country survey in all Latin American and Caribbean countries, the U.S. and Canada, we restrict the analysis to the Latin American states since we only have information on political parties for the Latin American continent.

Next to the inclusion of a political party in both the LAPOP and the DALP survey, we restrict our sample to those parties with a minimum of 5 expert evaluations in the expert survey. In total, our study covers 7910 individuals and 83 political parties from the following 18 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

4. 2 Model for the Micro Logic

Again, the need for a hierarchical estimation model follows from the structure of the data. Individual level observations are nested in countries so that the prerequisite for a standard OLS regression is not fulfilled. A linear model is applied as the dependent variable vote intention can be treated as

continuous variable⁴. The intercept is not constrained so that it can vary by country. Furthermore, as we are interested in the interaction effect between income group and the level of clientelism, we test with a Likelihood Ratio test if the cross-level interaction adds explanatory power to the model. The test is significant. To specify the model we describe the equation as follows, for $i=1, \dots$ (for N individuals) and for $j=1, \dots$ (for J countries):

$$y_{ij} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta_1 \text{income}_i + \beta_2 X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\alpha_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{vote buying}_j + \beta_3 K_j + \eta_j$$

$$\eta_j \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta)$$

Subsequently, we add a cross-level interaction term Z ($\text{income}_i \times \text{vote buying}_j$) to the equation. In order to test how much variance in y is explained by level two we calculate the intra-class coefficient by dividing the variance of the intercept σ_α^2 by itself plus the variance of the residual σ_ε^2 (Gelman and Hill 2007: 448). We receive an ICC of 0.46. Hence, more than 46% of the individual's vote intention is explained by level two. Multilevel models can be interpreted as in-between strategy regarding the choice to either pool the data or to analyze each country separately (non-pooling strategy) (see Gelman and Hill 2007), so that an ICC of 0.46 supports the need for a hierarchical model. The low number of observations at level two poses a caveat for the analysis pursued below as the number of free parameters at the country level is very limited (for a detailed discussion see Stegmueller 2013). We therefore add control variables at level two with a step-wise procedure.

4.3 Variables and Controls

Political parties are categorized in the expert survey according to their orientation on a set of policy issues such as economic and social policy, as well as their stance on redistribution. To receive our dependent variable we take the mean of the expert ratings on three relevant policy items and reduce the items to a social policy indicator with the usage of PCA as discussed above (social spending on the disadvantaged (item D1), state role in governing the economy (item D2), and public spending (item D3)). The latent information of the parties' social policy orientation in terms of progressive (i.e. lower values) or regressive (i.e. higher values) distribution patterns is captured by the first

⁴ Technically speaking, the DV is constrained by floor and ceiling, however, since the range is quite large and it is not a categorical variable, we decide to use a linear model. Moreover, the hierarchical model is already quite demanding regarding the scope of the data so that a linear model is considered reasonable.

component. We then merge this information on political parties with individual level data from the LAPOP survey. Next to socio-demographic information, individuals are asked to name the party they personally identify with, assuming that this would also be the party for which the respondent would cast her vote in elections. If individuals do not indicate a specific party preference, we exclude the observation so that the analysis focuses on those individuals which made their party choice explicit. We acknowledge that there might be sampling bias as we oversample those individuals which indicate a party preference. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view it is less likely that this sampling strategy leads to a bias in the variables of interest as reporting a party preference in a survey might be more probable for individuals with higher education and higher income, so that we rather oversample the well educated and not the poor. We test how non-response on the item party preference (a dichotomous variable is created based on VB11 in LAPOP 2010) is influenced by sociodemographic factors (age, gender, income, education and employment status) with a logistic hierarchical regression. The estimation results⁵ show that male, employed, older, and well educated individuals are most likely to respond on the item that enquires party preference. Moreover, middle-income earners also have an increased likelihood to respond compared to low-income earners. The coefficient is not significant for the high-income group so that our sampling strategy oversamples middle-income earners, which needs to be kept in mind for the interpretation of results.

We assume that vote-buying mediates the effect of the individual's income status on vote intention. Consequently, we create a cross-level interaction term between income and the country's level of clientelism. As described in section 2, the degree of clientelism in a country is calculated by weighting the mean expert rating of a political parties' effort in mobilizing supporters using a clientelistic linkage strategy (item B1) with its seat share in the lower chamber for the last election before 2009. Furthermore, we apply different measures for income to ensure the robustness of our findings. We use income deciles (Q10, LAPOP) and generate income groups based on them. No-income and the first three deciles are coded as low-income group, decile 4 to 6 are coded as middle-income group and the 7th to 10th decile reflects the high-income group. Figure A.1 in the Appendix displays the distribution of income groups across countries within our sample. Furthermore, the LAPOP also enquires asset information, asking the respondent if she possesses a TV, a phone or a car for instance. We use multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), as we are dealing with dichotomous variables, to reduce the asset indicators to an overall wealth indicator, which illustrates the long-term wealth of the individual (see Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Vyas and Kumaranayake,

⁵ Available on request.

2006). Higher values illustrate a higher wealth. Our asset indicator is positively correlated to the income variable, but they do not fully overlap as the former illustrates the long-term wealth of the individual while the latter attributes to the current income situation. To operationalize risk aversion and the individual's time horizon considering her propensity to wait for future public goods we need to rely on a proxy. We use an item that enquires if the individual feels economically at risk or if the respondent has sufficient means to save (Q10D LAPOP 2010).

Furthermore, we control for gender (female), age, level of education (in years), voting experience, political interest, employment status (non-employed such as retired, student, unemployed, is the reference category), and the urban-rural divide. Information on the individuals religiosity is added because Scheve and Stasavage (2006) found empirical evidence that more religious individuals prefer less redistribution. Additionally, we include a variable for the individual's ideological beliefs in terms of social policy. Individuals holding the belief that income inequality should be reduced are more likely to make a vote choice for a party that scores high on progressive social policy issues.

We add the following macro level controls: firstly, we control for the degree of programmatic party system structuration to account for the possibility that political parties may pursue different linkage strategies at the same time, which might influence the effect of our cross-level interaction between clientelism and income since a programmatic linkage strategy is positively correlated with a political party's stance on social policy issues (see Figure 2). Calculations of the degree of programmatic party system structuration are based on item E2 from the DALP survey, to aggregate the expert ratings on this item we use the same procedure as for the degree of clientelism. Secondly, a variable for GDP per capita is included to hold constant the country's economic development status as welfare generosity is constrained by resource scarcity. Thirdly, we control for the status quo of the welfare state by adding the infant mortality rate (World Development Indicators, World Bank) for the previous year 2009 to take into account the adjustment time. As Ross (2006) emphasizes, infant mortality is a very clear indicator for social welfare of the low-income group. A control variable for the country's level of income inequality needs to be included, because inequality might induce greater demand for welfare generosity or progressive spending patterns to address this problem (see Finseraas 2009 for the OECD context). We use information from Solt (2009, version 4) on the gini coefficient (higher values mean higher income inequality). Finally, we make use of Rothstein's (2011) 'impartiality' indicator that measures the quality of the government as proxy for state capacity. Macro level controls are added stepwise because of the low number of free parameters at level two.

5 Results

Table 2 reports the results of several linear hierarchical varying-intercept regression models. Model 1 includes all individual level explanatory variables, Model 2 then adds a set of macro level predictors, and, finally, in Model 3 the cross-level interaction term between clientelism and income is added to the regression. Model 4 displays results for the models when a different set of macro controls, according to the step-wise inclusion strategy, is included in the main estimation model.

Table 2. Linear Hierarchical Varying-Intercept Regression:
DV = Social Policy Index (vote intention)

	Baseline b/se	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se
Micro predictors					
low income (<i>ref: high income</i>)		-0.027 (0.040)	-0.028 (0.040)	0.257+ (0.148)	0.261+ (0.153)
middle income		0.091* (0.037)	0.090* (0.037)	0.411** (0.153)	0.385* (0.158)
age		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
female		-0.061* (0.029)	-0.061* (0.029)	-0.060* (0.029)	-0.060* (0.030)
education		-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
employed		-0.017 (0.030)	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.019 (0.031)
urban		-0.078* (0.032)	-0.078* (0.032)	-0.077* (0.032)	-0.071* (0.034)
economic risk		0.031 (0.030)	0.031 (0.030)	0.030 (0.030)	0.031 (0.031)
religious		0.022* (0.011)	0.022* (0.011)	0.022* (0.011)	0.020+ (0.011)
active voter		-0.206*** (0.040)	-0.206*** (0.040)	-0.205*** (0.040)	-0.207*** (0.041)
political interest		-0.049*** (0.014)	-0.048*** (0.014)	-0.047** (0.014)	-0.048** (0.015)
preference for redistribution		-0.057*** (0.010)	-0.057*** (0.010)	-0.057*** (0.010)	-0.062*** (0.010)
Macro predictors					
vote buying ^a			0.089 (0.315)	0.170 (0.317)	-0.346 (0.513)
programmatic ^a			-1.254* (0.519)	-1.244* (0.519)	-1.118 (0.761)
infant mortality rate			-0.061* (0.010)	-0.061* (0.010)	

			(0.026)	(0.026)	
gini			0.218***	0.217***	
			(0.053)	(0.053)	
impartiality					-0.051
					(0.587)
GDP pc (log)					0.065
					(0.499)
Cross-level interactions					
low income x vote buying ^a				-0.107*	-0.109*
				(0.053)	(0.055)
middle income x vote buying ^a				-0.120*	-0.108+
				(0.055)	(0.057)
constant	0.229	0.885**	-4.449	-4.662	4.489
	(0.261)	(0.298)	(3.076)	(3.078)	(4.800)
Random effects parameters					
Var (constant)	1.223	1.287	0.521	0.522	1.077
	(0.409)	(0.443)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.382)
Var (residual)	1.427	1.405	1.405	1.404	1.455
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)
N Level 1	8505	7910	7910	7910	7517
N Level 2	18	17	17	17	16
Chi ²		106.22	131.31	137.18	114.92
//	-13633.23	-12619.06	-12611.41	-12608.51	-12122.09
BIC	27293.60	25372.76	25393.36	25405.51	24431.60
ICC	0.461	0.478	0.271	0.271	0.425

+ p <0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001


Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: DALP 2009; LAPOP 2010; World Bank (WDI); Solt 2009; QoG (impartiality) 2011.

^a Measured at party system level.

First of all, the findings speak for a conditional effect of income relative to the degree of clientelism on individual support for regressive political parties as expected in H2. More specifically, individuals belonging to the low-income group (compared to those in the high-income group) are more likely to prefer a political party with a regressive social policy stance the higher the degree of clientelism in a country is (Model 3). Low-income earners – the main beneficiaries of progressive welfare states – support parties which strongly pursue progressive social policies only when the degree of clientelism is low. Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that clientelism even reinforces high-income earners' support for more regressive social policy platforms. Of course, high-income earners already prefer parties, which foster less redistributive policies according to theory, nevertheless, clientelism seems to increase this inclination even more. Since the high-income group holds a

decisive position in Latin American societies, their vote is highly influential. Thus, clientelism increases the likelihood of regressive welfare policies over all income groups. We plot the predictive marginal effects for the interaction terms in Figure 2 in order to make the finding more intuitive. The slope increases for all income groups as the level of clientelism rises. Overlapping confidence intervals (not displayed) indicate, however, that the income groups as such are less distinguishable from each other.

Figure 2: Predictive Margins of Income Groups over Levels of Clientelism



Turning toward the micro-level controls (see Table 2), we find significant effects on support for progressive social policy platforms for females, active voters, and individuals living in urban areas. Also individuals with more intensive interests in politics and those who have pro-redistributive social policy preferences are in favor of parties that pursue more progressive social policies. Religiosity leads to greater support for regressive social policy parties. All micro-level effects are in line with our theoretical expectations.

Concerning the macro-level controls infant mortality and programmatic party system structuration significantly reduce the support for political parties with regressive social policy

platforms, while higher income inequality - measured by the gini coefficient – significantly increases the support for political parties with regressive social policy platforms. The latter effect, however, is counterintuitive and demands further investigation. The level of GDP and state capacity, measured by the government’s level of impartiality, do not significantly influence vote intention (Model 4, Table 2).

6 Robustness Test

To test the sensitivity of our findings, we conduct the analysis with two alternative measures of income. We use income deciles (Model 7-8, Table 3), treated as continuous measure instead of forming income groups as done above, and we apply the asset indicator that represents the individual’s long-term wealth status (Model 5-6, Table 3). Again, we visualize the interaction effects between income (deciles), respectively wealth (MCA), with the degree of clientelism in Figure 3 and 4. Similar to the finding from the previous section, both slopes are increasing the larger the degree of clientelism, supporting the additional finding that clientelism also reinforces support for parties that score high on regressive social policies the higher the income situation of the individual (see Figure 3 and 4).

Table 3. Linear Hierarchical Varying-Intercept Regression: DV = Social Policy Index (vote intention)

	Model 5 b/se	Model 6 b/se	Model 7 b/se	Model 8 b/se
Micro predictors				
income (MCA)	0.025 (0.019)	-0.025 (0.070)		
income (deciles)			0.015* (0.008)	-0.049* (0.025)
age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
female	-0.064* (0.029)	-0.064* (0.029)	-0.074* (0.030)	-0.073* (0.030)
education	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
employed	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.010 (0.031)	-0.012 (0.031)
urban	-0.075* (0.033)	-0.074* (0.033)	-0.075* (0.034)	-0.070* (0.034)
economic risk	0.028	0.028	0.043	0.044

	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
religious	0.021+	0.021+	0.032**	0.032**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
active voter	-0.207***	-0.206***	-0.194***	-0.195***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.042)
political interest	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.064***	-0.061***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
pref. for redistribution	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.059***	-0.060***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Macro predictors				
vote buying ^a	0.095	0.039	0.096	-0.009
	(0.314)	(0.323)	(0.310)	(0.313)
programmatic ^a	-1.267*	-1.260*	-1.231*	-1.226*
	(0.518)	(0.518)	(0.512)	(0.512)
infant mortality rate	-0.059*	-0.059*	-0.061*	-0.061*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
gini	0.218***	0.218***	0.218***	0.216***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Cross-level interaction				
income (MCA) x vote buying		0.018		
		(0.024)		
income (decile) x vote buying				0.024**
				(0.009)
constant	-4.509	-4.368	-4.538	-4.224
	(3.069)	(3.073)	(3.036)	(3.036)
Random effects parameters				
Var (constant)	0.519	0.518	0.507	0.507
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.175)	(0.175)
Var (residual)	1.407	1.407	1.391	1.391
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)
N level 1	7909	7909	7244	7244
N level 2	17	17	17	17
Chi ²	119.33	119.93	129.12	136.52
//	-12616.24	-12615.96	-11519.45	-11515.82
BIC	25394.05	25402.46	23198.88	23200.51
ICC	0.269	0.269	0.267	0.267

+ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: DALP 2009; LAPOP 2010; World Bank (WDI); Solt 2009.

^a Measured at party system level.

Figure 3. Predictive Margins of Wealth (MCA) over Levels of Vote Buying with 95% CI's





Figure 4. Predictive Margins of Income (deciles) over Levels of Vote Buying with 95% CI's



7 Conclusion

Is vote buying indeed a bad bargain for the poor? This is the question that we addressed in this study. We started our empirical investigation at the meso-level, analyzing the connection between

political parties' social policy platforms and their efforts in pursuing either clientelistic or programmatic linkages with their supporters. Based on expert survey ratings on several social policy items and linkage types, we provide evidence that parties which put higher effort to establish a clientelistic linkage with their supporters are also more regressive with respect to their social policy stances. The reverse relationship is indicated by the data for the degree of programmatic linkage a party pursues, i.e. the more programmatic the less regressive the party platform on social issues. Hence, we were able to confirm hypothesis 1 that, *ceteris paribus*, clientelistic parties are more likely to pursue regressive social policies.

Moving to the micro-level, we conducted a linear hierarchical varying-intercept regression analysis to test hypothesis 2, which states that low-income earners are more likely to vote for parties that pursue regressive social policies if the level of clientelism is high. Our results confirm that vote buying does significantly increase the vote intention for parties that pursue more regressive social policies across all income groups, as expected in H2. More specifically, clientelism subverts the vote-intention of low-income earners to cast a vote against their objective interest, which is particularly harmful for the poor in the long run, even though income groups are not statistically different from each other. Additionally, when high-income voters are more inclined to vote for parties that pursue less redistributive social policy conditional on a higher level of clientelism, than it can have even more severe negative externalities for the poor. The poor are less likely to turnout, while the rich do not only have a higher propensity to vote but also to influence the government by belonging to the elite circles. Thus, when the dominant social class – the high-income earners – are more likely to vote for parties that score high on regressive social policy orientation because of clientelism, than it is not surprising that regressive social policies are very persistent in Latin America. In this line of reasoning, vote buying symbolizes a bad-bargain for the poor in the long run, as it only substantiates the truncated nature of the welfare systems.

Appendix

Figure A.1. Descriptive Statistics: The distribution of income groups by country



Graphs by country

Table A.1. DALP Survey Items

Item	Question Wording and Scales
	D1-D6: We would now like to learn what positions different parties take in [COUNTRY] with respect to different policies and issues. Below you will find questions on several economic, cultural and social, and other issues upon which parties in [COUNTRY] may take different positions.
D1	Social spending on the disadvantaged: [1] Party advocates extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society. [10] Party opposes extensive social spending redistributing income to benefit the less well-off in society.
D2	State role in governing the economy: [1] Party supports a major role for the state in regulating private economic activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, and/or maintaining control over key services. [10] Party advocates a minimal role for the state in governing or directing economic activity or development.
D3	Public Spending: [1] Party supports extensive public provision of benefits such as earnings-related pension benefits, comprehensive national health care, and basic primary and secondary schools for everyone. [10] Party opposes an extensive state role in providing such benefits and believes that such things as health insurance, pensions, and schooling should be privately provided or that participation in public social insurance programs should be voluntary.
D6	Overall Left-Right Placement: [1] Party is best located at the “left” of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework. [10] Party is best located at the “right” of the national political spectrum based upon its overall policy positions and ideological framework.
E3	Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party’s positions on policy issues. Answer categories: 1=Not at all; 2=To a small extent; 3=To a moderate extent; 4=To a great extent
E1	To what extent do parties seek to mobilize electoral support by featuring a party leader’s charismatic personality? [1] Very little/ Not at all, [2] To a rather limited extent, [3] Quite vigorously, [4] Very strongly, [X] Don't know.
B1	Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give consumer goods (e.g., food or liquor, clothes, cookware, appliances, medicines, building materials etc.) as inducements to obtain votes. How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing consumer goods? [1] A negligible effort or not at all, [2] A minor effort, [3] A moderate effort, [4] A major effort, [X] Don't know.

Source: Questionnaire DALP, <https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html>

Table A.2. Party Acronyms

Country	Political parties
Argentina	Peronist Party (PJ), Radical Civic Union (UCR), Front for Victory (FPV), Republican Proposal (PRO)
Bolivia	Movement for Socialism (MAS), Social and Democratic Power (PODEM(1)), Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), National Unity Front (UN(1))
Brazil	Liberal Front Party (PFL), Liberal Party-Party of the Republic (PL-PR), Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), Progressive Party (PP(1)), Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), Workers' Party (PT), Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), Democratic Labour Party (PDT), Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Popular Socialist Party (PPS(1))
Chile	Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD), Independent Democratic Union (UDI), Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh), National Renewal (RN), Christian Democratic Party (PDC(1)), Party for Democracy (PPD)
Colombia	Colombian Liberal Party (PLC(1)), Colombian Conservative Party (PCC), Social Party of National Unity (PU), Radical Change (MCR), Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), Citizens' Convergence (CC), Team Colombia Movement (MEC)
Costa Rica	Citizen's Action Party (PAC), National Liberation Parties (PLN(1)), Libertarian Movement Party (PML), Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC)
Dominican Republic	Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD(3)), Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC), Dominican Liberation Party (PLD)
Ecuador	Social Christian Party (PSC(2)), Democratic Left (ID), Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE), Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement (MUPP), Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (PRIAN), Patriotic Society Party (PSP)
El Salvador	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Party of National Conciliation (PCN), Christian Democratic Party (PDC(2));
Guatemala	Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), Grand National Alliance (GANAN), National Advancement Party (PAN(1)), Patriotic Party (PP(2)), National Unity of Hope (UNE)
Honduras	Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH), National Party of Honduras (PNH)
Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN(2)), Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD(1)), Ecological Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), Convergence (CONV)
Nicaragua	Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC(2))
Panama	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD(2)), Panameñista Party (PA), Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIR), Solidarity Party(PS), Democratic Change (PCD), National Liberal Party(PLN(2))
Paraguay	National Republican Association(ANR), Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA), Beloved Fatherland Party (PPQ), National Union of Ethical Citizens (PUNACE), Democratic Progressive Party(PDP), Tekojoja Movement (MPT)
Peru	Union for Peru (UPP), American Popular Revolutionary Alliance(APRA), National Unity (UN(2)), Alliance for the Future (APF), Center Front (FDC)
Uruguay	National Party (PN), Colorado Party (PC), Broad Front (FA)
Venezuela	Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), For Social Democracy(PODEM(2), Fatherland for All (PPT), Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV)

Table A.3. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>DV:</i>					
social policy	8505	0.000	1.667	-3.378	3.472
<i>Indep. Var.:</i>					
income	8615	1.852	0.792	1	3
income (MCA)	8614	3.013	1.029	0.378	4.983
income (deciles)	7843	4.195	2.380	0	10
vote buying	8505	2.739	0.623	1.630	3.692
<i>Controls:</i>					
age	8491	41.100	16.254	16	92
female	8505	0.484	0.500	0	1
education	8481	9.074	4.572	0	18
employed	8495	0.569	0.495	0	1
urban	8505	1.306	0.461	1	2
economic risk	8426	0.493	0.500	0	1
religious	8429	3.073	1.391	1	5
active voter	8304	0.847	0.360	0	1
political interest	8458	2.623	0.971	1	4
pref. for redistribution	8313	5.963	1.397	1	7
<i>Macro</i>					
infant mortality rate	8615	18.515	7.771	7.8	36.8
gini coefficient	8615	45.378	3.166	36.439	51.125
programmatic party sys.	8505	3.022	0.308	1.927	3.564
informal sector (urban)	8615	47.020	8.651	30	59.900
GDP per capita (log)	8615	8.124	0.655	7.046	9.014
impartiality	8207	-0.401	0.622	-1.476	0.703
DALP Data					
social	90	4.970	1.222	1.6	7.111
economic	90	5.499	1.683	1.4	8.556
public	90	4.904	1.441	2	7.722
vote buying	86	2.905	0.670	1.313	4
charisma	89	2.905	0.672	1.4	4
policy	90	2.990	0.432	1.857143	3.813
party age	90	38.778	41.840	2	172
seat share	88	19.105	15.632	1.25	68.26

Sources: LAPOP 2010; DALP 2009; World Bank (WDI); QoG (2011); Solt (2009); CEPAL (2014).

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